“Trading with the Enemy: How the EU Empowered Putin and How the UK Stood Firm”
Since trade has been an “exclusive competence” of the European Commission, the UK could never have taken the lead on this issue without Brexit. Three years after Putin’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, I reveal how — despite the imposition of so-called sanctions — the European Union has continued to sustain the Putin regime by purchasing billions of euros worth of Russian products. This trade has provided Russia with critical foreign currency, without which its economy would have faced a far more devastating collapse than it currently endures. It is highly probable that Putin’s regime would not have survived under such circumstances.
This report provides the official EU-Russia trade figures and compares them with the performance of the United Kingdom. In broad terms, the UK has applied sanctions which have been effective, whilst the EU has talked a great deal about applying sanctions but has continued to trade with Russia to a significant degree, albeit at lower levels than before the war started.
“And by 24 February, exactly one year since the invasion started, we aim to have the tenth package of sanctions in place.”
- EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Kyiv, Thurs 02 Feb 2023
Putin’s illegal invasion started at the end of February (24 Feb 2022). The EU has produced numerous successive ‘sanctions packages’ in that time, to great fanfare on each occasion. This happened again just before Christmas, with their 25th ‘package’. Some might question the length of time it has taken the EU to implement these, given that the third anniversary of the start of this phase of the Russo-Ukraine war takes place on Monday. Below we summarise the limited effect of these EU ‘sanctions’ on EU-Russian trade. I then contrast this with the significantly superior performance by Brexit Britain.
Brexit Britain Outperforms the EU Yet Again
Here, I present a comparison of trade with Russia between the EU and Brexit Britain. Given that the EU bloc’s figures are significantly higher than the UK’s, I have converted these into percentages in the second and third charts, using Q1 2022 — the onset of the war — as a baseline. This approach highlights the relative performance with greater clarity.
This figure starkly contrasts with the UK’s total imports from Russia during the same period, which amounted to just £12 billion. The disparity highlights differing approaches to trade policies and reliance on Russian resources between the EU and the UK. While the EU has faced criticism for its continued economic engagement with Russia, member states argue that certain dependencies, particularly in energy, have been challenging to overcome swiftly.
In contrast, the UK has taken a more stringent stance, significantly reducing its imports and imposing stricter sanctions. This divergence raises questions about the effectiveness of collective EU measures versus unilateral actions by individual nations like the UK. The period from 2022 to 2024 underscores the complexities of balancing economic interests with geopolitical and ethical considerations in times of conflict.
[Converted to British pounds (GBP) at £1.00=€1.22]
- EU27 : £237.1 bn
- UK : £5.2 bn
2. Percentage reduction in goods bought (imports) from Putin’s Russia
Purchasing from Putin’s Russia: A 2024% decline in imports since the beginning of 2022.EU 85% UK 100%
This enduring economic interdependence highlights the EU’s reluctance to impose stricter measures against Russia, even in the face of repeated aggression. While sanctions were introduced following the annexation of Crimea, they were arguably insufficient to deter further hostile actions. The lack of a unified and robust response not only emboldened Putin but also underscored the EU’s reliance on Russian energy exports, particularly natural gas.
The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 served as a stark reminder of the consequences of inaction. Despite initial sanctions and condemnations, the EU’s hesitancy to fully sever economic ties with Russia raised questions about its commitment to upholding international law and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Critics argue that a more resolute stance, including comprehensive trade restrictions and energy diversification, could have significantly altered the course of events.
As the conflict unfolded, the EU began to take more concrete steps, such as reducing its dependence on Russian energy and supporting Ukraine with financial and military aid. However, these measures came after years of enabling economic ties that had already bolstered Russia’s capacity for aggression. The situation illustrates the importance of preemptive action and the dangers of prioritizing short-term economic interests over long-term geopolitical stability.
This newfound autonomy of Brexit allowed the UK to implement targeted sanctions against Russian oligarchs, freeze assets, and restrict trade in critical sectors. These actions not only underscored the UK’s commitment to holding Russia accountable but also demonstrated the advantages of a more agile and independent foreign policy framework.
In contrast, the EU’s collective decision-making process, while ensuring unity among member states, often led to delays in implementing sanctions. The need for consensus among 27 nations made it challenging to act swiftly, especially when member states had differing economic dependencies on Russia. For instance, countries like Germany, heavily reliant on Russian natural gas, were initially hesitant to adopt stringent measures that could jeopardize their energy security.
The divergence in approaches between the UK and the EU highlights the broader debate on the balance between collective action and national sovereignty. While the EU’s coordinated efforts ensured a unified stance, the UK’s independent strategy showcased the potential for quicker, more decisive actions in times of geopolitical crises.
This contrast between the EU and the UK highlights the broader implications of centralized decision-making versus national sovereignty. While the EU’s collective approach often aims for consensus, it can lead to delays that undermine the urgency required in critical situations. The UK, free from such constraints, has demonstrated how independent governance can enable quicker, more decisive action on the global stage.
However, the EU’s reliance on Russian imports and its ongoing trade relationship with Moscow raises pressing questions about the bloc’s commitment to isolating Putin’s regime. Despite public declarations of solidarity with Ukraine, the financial flows from the EU to Russia suggest a contradiction between words and actions. This inconsistency risks undermining the EU’s credibility and weakening the broader Western response to Russian aggression.
As the war in Ukraine continues, the need for a unified and effective strategy becomes ever more urgent. The EU must reconcile its internal divisions and bureaucratic inertia to present a stronger front. Meanwhile, the UK’s ability to act decisively serves as a reminder of the potential benefits of streamlined governance, particularly in times of crisis. The question remains: will the EU adapt to the realities of this conflict, or will it remain hindered by its structural inefficiencies?
[ Sources: EU Commission (Eurostat) | UK Office for National Statistics ]
