How Did the Anglo-Zulu War Start And Why? And a little-known battle.
To truly grasp the dynamics of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, it is essential to delve into the mindset of the key figures in Natal and the British government during that era. Orders were frequently disobeyed, and the men stationed in the region were often granted considerable autonomy to act in what they believed served the interests of the British Empire. This autonomy extended to representatives in other parts of the vast empire, many of whom were unapologetically ruthless in pursuing what they deemed best for Britain.
Let’s first examine the principal players in this dramatic clash of power in Southern Africa and the UK. On the Zulu side, we have King Cetshwayo — a proud and formidable leader of the Zulu nation. Cetshwayo was the son of King Mpande and the half-nephew of the legendary Zulu king Shaka. Shaka, renowned as one of the most ruthless Zulu kings, revolutionized the Zulu military structure, forging them into the formidable force they were when Cetshwayo ascended to power. Like his predecessor, Cetshwayo could be ruthless when necessary.
King Mpande had favored another son, Mbuyazi, as his successor, but Cetshwayo refused to accept this. In 1856, Cetshwayo led his forces against Mbuyazi in the Battle of Ndondakusuka, decisively defeating him and killing not only Mbuyazi but five other brothers as well. This battle cemented Cetshwayo’s dominance and paved the way for his reign as the undisputed leader of the Zulu kingdom.
For the British, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli and his Tory government were at the helm. Key figures included Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, the 4th Earl of Carnarvon and British Colonial Secretary in 1877; Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who succeeded him as Colonial Secretary in 1878; and Sir Bartle Frere, the controversial high commissioner for South Africa, often seen as the antagonist in this historical narrative.
This era was a defining moment in British colonial history, as the government wrestled with the complexities of expanding and maintaining its empire. Disraeli’s administration faced escalating tensions in South Africa, largely fuelled by Sir Bartle Frere’s confrontational policies toward the Zulu Kingdom. His aggressive approach sparked widespread debate and ultimately led to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, a conflict that underscored the inherent contradictions of imperial rule. Meanwhile, figures like Carnarvon and Hicks Beach were instrumental in shaping colonial policy, balancing the pressures of domestic politics with the challenges of managing an increasingly vast and diverse empire.
So, what unfolded? In 1877, Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, as Colonial Secretary, dispatched Sir Bartle Frere to the Cape Colony as governor and high commissioner. Frere’s mission was to implement the proposed Confederation of British South Africa, uniting the British colonies with the Boer republics. However, upon his arrival, Frere encountered a colony in disarray. The local settlers were resistant to Carnarvon’s federation plans, while the recently annexed Transvaal Boers leaned toward reclaiming independence rather than joining a federation. Carnarvon’s resignation in January 1878 further undermined Frere’s authority, and his failure to de-escalate the situation only deepened the turmoil.
What was the British Government’s position on this war?
The Disraeli Government was firmly against engaging in a war. Contrary to popular belief, the British Empire did not simply charge into conflicts with a gung-ho attitude. In this instance, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Colonial Secretary, made the government’s stance abundantly clear: they did not desire a war in Zululand. He emphasized this position in a letter to Sir Bartle Frere, writing, “The fact is, matters in Eastern Europe and India… are of such serious an aspect that we cannot now have a Zulu war in addition to other greater and too possible troubles.” This statement reflected Britain’s focus on more pressing concerns, such as the Russian threat to Constantinople and Afghanistan, which were considered higher priorities at the time.
However, Sir Bartle Frere, stationed in South Africa, had a different perspective. His primary concern revolved around the Zulu people. Frere became convinced that the Zulu were a significant obstacle to establishing a federation in the region. The Zulu were a formidable force — powerful, independent, and unafraid to confront European settlers when provoked, as the Boers had discovered to their detriment.
The Zulu’s reputation for strength and resistance was rooted in historical events. For example, on January 25, 1838, King Dingane of the Zulu met with Piet Retief, leader of the Voortrekkers during the Great Trek. Initially, negotiations over land seemed promising, with Dingane even signing over territory to Retief. However, this apparent goodwill took a dark turn. During celebrations at the king’s kraal, the Zulus ambushed Retief, his son Pieter Cornelis, and their party of approximately 100 people. They were taken to a nearby ridge, kwaMatiwane — later known as Execution Hill — where they were brutally killed. Retief was executed last, forced to witness the deaths of his son and comrades. His chest was sawn open, and his heart and liver were removed and presented to Dingane. Their bodies were left on the hillside to be devoured by scavengers.
Dingane’s ruthlessness did not stop there. He ordered an attack on the Voortrekker camps, plunging the migrant movement into chaos and resulting in the deaths of 534 men, women, and children. This demonstrated the Zulu’s fierce resistance to any attempts at permanent land acquisition by outsiders. Dingane’s actions eventually led to the Battle of Blood River, where he suffered a significant defeat to the Boers, losing around 3,000 men. Two years later, Dingane was overthrown by Cetshwayo’s father.
The Zulu’s reputation as a formidable and unyielding force shaped Sir Bartle Frere’s view of them as a challenge to British ambitions in South Africa, despite the government’s clear opposition to war.
In Bartle Frere’s view, the powerful Zulu kingdom needed to be subdued. Only by eliminating this perceived obstacle could his broader plan succeed. To justify his actions, Frere exaggerated the Zulu threat. When the British government refused to authorize a war, he acted unilaterally. In December 1878, he presented the Zulu king, Cetshwayo, with an ultimatum designed to provoke conflict.
The ultimatum demanded, among other things, the disbandment of the Zulu army and the acceptance of a British resident — terms Cetshwayo could not accept without jeopardizing his rule. Frere anticipated this resistance. When Cetshwayo requested more time to consult with his council, Frere refused. On January 11, 1879, one day after the 30-day ultimatum expired, Lord Chelmsford’s №3 Column crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift and entered Zululand. Frere’s war had begun, and the British government, over 4,000 miles away, was powerless to intervene — a fact Frere had counted on.
However, Sir Bartle Frere and the British forces underestimated the strength and determination of the Zulu nation. On January 22, 1879, the Zulus struck back with devastating force in three key battles, delivering heavy blows to British morale and exposing the flaws in Frere’s strategy.
The Three battles that day were as follows
Isandlwana
Rorke’s Drift
Nyezane
The first two most people have heard about, Nyezane not so much, probably because it was overshadowed first by the Isandlwana massacre and then the heroic defence at Rorke's Drift, which is a shame because it's now mainly been forgotten about and the soldiers who fought in the battle have not received the accolades they so richly deserved.
Most people only think only one column under Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand, however, there were three. It so happened that the one Lord Chelmsford was with, was the main thrust into Zululand and which was the centre column and the one that suffered the massacre. Lord Chelmsford's column was supported on its flanks by the Left and Right Columns.
The latter, also known as the Coastal Column, was under the command of Charles Pearson who was also the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Regiment (The Buffs). He, like his regiment, had a reputation for steadiness and reliability. His invasion command was formidable and consisted of over 400 men of his Regiment and 160 of the 99th (Duke of Edinburgh’s Lanarkshire) Regiment. He was accompanied by a strong contingent of Royal Engineers numbering 90 which was augmented by 60 men of the Natal Native Pioneers. The Royal Artillery's presence was two seven-pound guns which were operated by 22 men. The two battalions of the 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent supplied the largest number, 1,655 officers and men. The eyes of the Column were drawn from 115 Mounted Infantry and 117 Colonial troopers. Crucially, he had been given the Naval Landing Brigade from HMS Active numbering 138 sailors and marines. Crucially, he had been given the Naval Landing Brigade from HMS Active numbering 138 sailors and marines. Their firepower included two seven-pound guns, a rocket battery and a Gatling gun. This contingent of Blue Jackets, together with the Buffs, gave a strong backbone to Pearson’s command. Suffice it to say, that progress was slow, hampered by the inclement weather, a quagmire of a track and the many rivers and flooded dongas that had to be forded. Apart from several false alarms initiated by the “green” soldiers of the 99th, there had been no sign of the Zulus.
This was about to change
On the 21st of January, Pearson learned that about four to five thousand warriors were assembled at the royal homestead (ikhanda) at Gingindlovu. Detaching two companies of the Buffs, most of the Naval Brigade, his artillery, some mounted men and a couple of companies of NNC, Pearson sent them to verify the rumour. In fact, the impressive ikhanda was deserted, although, as they were soon to discover, the Zulus were not that far away. Pausing only for some target practice, which left the ikhanda in flames, the detachment returned to the main column. The activities of the column kept the Zulus at a distance which forced them to bring forward their original plan to attack the column. After dark, the Zulu impi, which had gained in numbers since leaving Ulundi and now had a strength of six thousand, reached the still-smouldering ikhanda. From here they followed the detachment’s trail until they approached the British camp. The Zulus then withdrew, deciding that they were unable to launch a coordinated attack at night in unfamiliar terrain. Also, they may have been deterred by the sentries routinely calling to each other that all was well. They may have thought their presence had been detected.
At daybreak, it was discovered that the long grass surrounding the British camp had been flattened, but of the Zulus, there was no trace. After sending out mounted scouts, Pearson quickly had the column on the move and by 4.30 am. all were heading for the next obstacle, the Inyezane River,
four miles distant. The scouts crossed the river and followed a track until they came upon a fairly open area approximately half a mile from the river. Beyond this point, the track climbed up a spur leading to the crest of a ridge. Extending from this ridge and running parallel on either side of the track were two further spurs. The ravines between the three spurs were filled with tall man-concealing grass. A third of the way up the central spur was a grassy knoll situated to the right of the track. Also to the right and dominating the ridge was a dome-shaped hill known locally as ‘Wombane’. On the left of the track and near the summit, was a native homestead (umuzi).
Below is a modern photo of ‘Wombane’ where the Zulus were massed and streamed down from when the NNC tried to take the hill
This is the route that the NNC took to attack Wombane hill and where the Zulus came down after most of the NNC began to run away, at the time there was no road or dirt track
This is the little hill where Coker took his Gatling gun and fired it from to scatter the Zulus.
This, then, was the terrain that confronted Colonel Pearson as he joined Captain Percy Barrow, the officer commanding the mounted troops. (1) Because of the surrounding thick bush, it was with some reluctance that Pearson took Barrow’s advice to call a breakfast halt prior to the long climb to their destination at Eshowe. While the laborious task of bringing the wagons across the Inyezane was being undertaken, some of the mounted troops, who were not on vedette duty, took the opportunity to bathe in one of the small streams that flowed down from the heights. In the meantime, the first wagons had crossed the river and had halted at the open area at the base of the centre spur. At around 8.00 am. one of the vedettes reported to Barrow that a small party of Zulus had been seen gathering in the hills ahead. Barrow passed this information on to Colonel Pearson who immediately ordered the NNC to advance in order to drive the Zulus off. Led by Captain Fitzroy Hart, the NNC advanced up the track on the centre spur. A small party of Zulu scouts were seen moving on the skyline above, melting into the bush and then reappearing on the lower slopes of Wombane to the right of the British. The NNC left the track and crossed the ravine before emerging onto the lower reaches of Wombane hill. Hart got his command into some sort of order before advancing up the slope. The officers had no knowledge of their troops’ language and the inevitable confusion ensued. The natives were clearly aware of the Zulus hiding in the long grass ahead and tried to warn their officers. In turn, the officers could not understand their men’s reluctance to advance and tried to urge them on. One even brandished his sword and yelled “Baleka!” thinking it was Zulu for “Charge!”In fact, it means “Run!” The natives needed no further encouragement; they turned and ran back down the slope into the protection of the ravine. At the same time, hundreds of Zulus emerged from behind the crest of the hill and fired a ragged volley before charging down onto the retreating NNC. Some white officers and NCOs were rooted to the spot and tried to hold their ground but were quickly overrun and killed. Hart did not stay to be slaughtered and managed to get back to safety. Meanwhile, the sudden volley of gunfire and yells alerted the troops and the rest of the mounted men at the wagon park. Those who were bathing hastily dressed and rushed back towards the centre spur. The battle started to evolve with no set plan. The Zulu charge by their left horn was the premature attack of a carefully planned ambush although the centre and right horn were not yet in a position to pose an effective threat. The Mounted Volunteers quickly formed a firing line to the right of the track and fired into the left flank of the Zulu horn as they tried to work their way towards the wagons. Hart’s men started to emerge from the undergrowth of the ravine only to be met by “friendly fire” until they were identified. Pearson could see he was in a highly vulnerable position. His wagons were strung out for miles and the river was dividing his command. He was in no position to form an effective defence and his only course of action was to rush as many reinforcements forward as possible. Fortunately, he already had with him his artillery, the guns and men of the Naval Brigade and two companies of the Buffs. As they were getting into position, the men of the Royal Engineers, who had been working at the river crossing, joined the Mounted Volunteers on the firing line and helped keep the Zulus at bay. The seven-pound guns and rocket tubes were dragged up to the track to the grassy knoll which gave them an excellent field of fire. The rest of the Zulu impi now appeared on the ridge above. The centre descended to occupy the umuzi while the right horn tried to encircle the British left. All the time British reinforcements were arriving at the double. Men from the 99th and another company from the Buffs hurried forward, while those further back in the column speculated what was happening beyond the crossing. Pearson placed himself on the knoll with the artillery and his beloved Buffs; he then ordered both the Queen’s and Regimental colours to be unfurled. The Zulus on the right had gone to the ground and were putting down heavy fire, they were also crawling through the thick grass and getting closer to the defenders. Casualties were mounting and some officers directed a concentrated fire on those Zulu sharpshooters who were causing the most damage. One casualty was Colonel Pearson’s horse, which was badly wounded and had to be put down.
NOW the next bit of the battle makes a little bit of British history.
Remenber I mentioned a Gatling gun? The Gatling gun was still at the wagon having sustained damage to its limber pole. It was rapidly repaired and a nineteen-year-old Midshipman, Lewis Coker, had it rushed up the track to the knoll. This young man had the distinction of supervising the first use, by the British, of the machine gun in battle. Although it soon jammed, the minute-long burst of 300 rounds, at an area of the bush from which there had been particularly galling fire, neutralised this troublesome source and proved this weapon’s worth.
Photograph, Zulu War, 1879.
Although it did not automatically reload under its own power the Gatling gun is considered by many to be the first modern machine gun. The gun’s multiple rotating barrels were turned by a hand crank. Each barrel fired a shot, ejected its cartridge and then loaded a new round
The two in the photo were probably taken at the camp at Isandlwana before the battle. We know that Lord Chelmsford took two Gatling guns with him as he set out from Isandlwana that fateful day, he thought the Zulus were at Ulundi where he hoped he would win a decisive battle thus ending the war. As we know he was wrong.
However, getting back to nineteen-year-old Midshipman, Lewis Coker, and the battle that was taking place on the same day at Nyezane. I doubt Midshipman Coker would have realised that he was the first man in the British military to use the machine gun in a battle but using it he did to good effect until it jammed. Meanwhile, the artillery and rocket tubes began to concentrate their fire on the umazi where the massed warriors were causing serious problems for the men on the knoll. A chance hit on the umazi by one of the notoriously unpredictable rockets caused the Zulus to scatter but not to retreat.
Meanwhile, on the left, the few men of the Colonial Volunteers had effectively prevented the Zulu right horn from advancing far enough to affect the outcome of the battle. When they tried to advance by another route further to the left, they were met by fire from just eight men of the Natal Hussars who had been acting as a vedette before the fight. This limited action was enough to make the Zulus withdraw back beyond the ridge.
The British realised that the Zulu attack on their right had slackened and that the Zulus were slowly retreating back up Wombane. Pearson then agreed to allow the Naval Brigade, supported by a company of Buffs, to advance and clear the umazi of any remaining Zulus. Led by Commander Campbell, the ‘Blue Jackets’ tore up the centre spur with guns blazing and drove the Zulus from the umazi. The advance slowed as it met stiff resistance near the top of the ridge and several sailors were shot. The attack stalled about 100 yards from the summit with the Zulus firing not only from the ridge above but also from both flanks. Campbell requested reinforcements but, before they could arrive, he ordered his men to charge again. Yelling and with fixed cutlass bayonets, the sailors reached the summit and put the Zulus to flight. Up to this point, the Zulus considered that they were winning until ‘those horrible men in the white trousers rushed up and showered lead on us they later said.’ The Naval Brigade and the Buffs, much to their annoyance, had not been able to keep up with the sailors and now moved to clear Wombane to their right. By now the Zulus had conceded defeat and were streaming away. The time was 9.30 am. and the battle lasted eighty minutes.
Unlike subsequent battles of the war, the mounted troops did not pursue and slaughter their vanquished foe. Instead, the Zulu wounded were given water and medical treatment. Prisoners had been taken and, after being questioned, were then released. However, after Isandlwana, this humane behaviour was abandoned. The greatest calamity to befall the British Army was only three hours and fifty miles away. With it came to a hardening of attitude towards the Zulus and there was an unofficial understanding that no prisoners were to be taken, and defeated warriors were thereafter to be hunted down and killed.
With the Zulus disappearing over the surrounding hills, the British counted the cost of the battle, ten of the NNC had been killed in the initial clash on Wombane and two privates of the Buffs died during the battle; twenty had been wounded, two of whom later died. A common grave was dug just below the knoll; the dead were buried and the spot was marked with a wooden cross. A body count was made of the Zulu dead, and some 400 were left where they fell. Many more had been wounded but had been carried from the battlefield. Amongst the Zulus, there was much recrimination. Their carefully prepared trap had been sprung with the premature attack by their left horn. The centre and right horns had not responded until later and had not given support. In fact, the right horn had shown an un-Zulu lack of resolve and the ambush had been quickly neutralised. This and the battle itself were all but forgotten and overshadowed by the events at Isandlwana. Colonel Pearson, however, had grounds for satisfaction at the way his men had behaved in this stiff little action. From potential disaster, the British had improvised a resounding victory, sadly to be overshadowed by Isandlwana. Having buried his dead and tended the wounded, Pearson was anxious to move on, not only to reach Eshowe but also to show the distant watching Zulus that they had not deflected the British advance. As the British column slowly ascended the escarpment towards Eshowe, the sun partially disappeared behind the moon bathing the land in a premature twilight, many soldiers thought it was a bad omen. This was the Solar Eclipse that bought darkness to the battlefield as the Zulu overran Isandlwana, indeed a bad omen
Where the dead were buried
What happened to these Game of Thrones players in Zululand?
Cetshwayo
Cetshwayo was a man who lost everything due to the sheer incompetence of the British during a war that no one wanted. Although the British ultimately emerged victorious, Cetshwayo faced a tragic downfall. After the Battle of Ulundi, he was captured and exiled to Cape Town. Later, he was taken to London, where he met Queen Victoria. In 1883, Cetshwayo returned to Zululand under British protection.
The British government attempted to restore Cetshwayo to power over part of his former territory, but this effort failed as civil war had erupted among Zulu factions by that time. A Zulu chief named Zibhebhu, with the support of Boer mercenaries, contested the succession and launched a series of attacks against Cetshwayo. On July 22, 1883, Zibhebhu attacked Cetshwayo’s new kraal, wounding him and forcing him to flee to Nkandla.
Following pleas from the Resident Commissioner, Sir Melmoth Osborne, Cetshwayo relocated to Eshowe. Tragically, he passed away a few months later on February 8, 1884, at the age of 57–60. While his death is presumed to have been caused by a heart attack, some theories suggest he may have been poisoned.
Henry Bartle Frere
What can be said about this man? In my opinion, he was a walking disaster. The invasion of Zululand marked the beginning of the turmoil he unleashed in that region of Africa. This invasion, lasting only six months, resulted in thousands of deaths and ultimately led to the First Boer War a decade later. Between these two conflicts, the Basuto Gun War further exacerbated the instability.
Frere deliberately timed his correspondence to the Government at Westminster to ensure his letters arrived after the invasion had commenced. He knew that, once the invasion was underway, the Government would have no choice but to support him and the war. Eventually, in 1880, Frere was recalled to London by the Gladstone Government to face charges of misconduct. Upon his return, he addressed the accusations concerning his actions in both Afghanistan and South Africa — issues previously highlighted in Gladstone’s Midlothian speeches. However, as he was preparing a more comprehensive defence, Frere passed away on May 29, 1884.
Frere’s legacy remains one of controversy and debate. His actions in Zululand and South Africa are often criticized for their recklessness and disregard for the human cost. Yet, some argue that his strategic mindset and ability to manipulate political circumstances demonstrated a certain brilliance, albeit one overshadowed by the consequences of his decisions.
In Afghanistan, his policies were equally contentious, marked by an aggressive approach that many deemed imperialistic. Critics have pointed out that his methods often prioritized British dominance over diplomacy, leaving a trail of resentment and instability in their wake. Nonetheless, supporters of Frere contend that he acted in the best interests of the Empire during a time of global uncertainty and competition.
Despite the mixed opinions surrounding his career, one aspect remains undeniable: Frere was a man of ambition and conviction. His willingness to take bold risks, even at great personal and political cost, shaped the trajectory of British foreign policy in the late 19th century. Whether viewed as a visionary or a villain, Frere’s impact on history continues to spark discussion among historians and scholars alike.
Frederic Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford
This man is often unfairly criticized, yet his military career reflects notable competence. After being initially rejected by the Grenadier Guards, he began his service in 1844 by purchasing a commission in the Rifle Brigade and was subsequently stationed in Canada. In November 1845, he secured an exchange into the Grenadier Guards as an ensign and lieutenant. His career progressed further in May 1855 when he was deployed to Crimea, where he was appointed deputy assistant quartermaster general in November 1855, serving on the staff at Headquarters. Promoted to brevet major, he earned recognition for his contributions, being mentioned in dispatches and receiving the fifth class of the Turkish Order of the Medjidie, an honour awarded for exceptional service to the state by foreign nationals.
In the years following his service in Crimea, his military career continued to flourish. He was promoted to major in the Grenadier Guards in 1858, a testament to his growing reputation as a capable and diligent officer. His expertise in logistics and administration became increasingly evident, earning him further responsibilities within the army. By 1864, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel, demonstrating his ability to lead and manage complex operations effectively.
Beyond his military achievements, he displayed a keen interest in modernizing military practices and improving the welfare of soldiers under his command. His forward-thinking ideas often set him apart from his contemporaries, solidifying his status as a progressive leader within the armed forces. Despite facing occasional criticism, his unwavering commitment to service and innovation left an indelible mark on the institutions he served.
He was later deployed to India, where he participated in the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and earned recognition in dispatches for his service. During his time in India, he formed a close friendship with Sir Henry Bartle Frere, a relationship that would gain significance years later in South Africa.
In March 1877, he was promoted to major general and, in February 1878, appointed to command British forces in the Cape Colony, assuming the local rank of lieutenant general. Seeking a posting abroad to take advantage of the lower cost of living, he succeeded his father as the 2nd Baron Chelmsford in October of that year. The following year, acting on orders from Sir Henry Bartle Frere, he crossed the river at Rorke’s Drift into Zululand.
The rest, as they say, is history, and much has been debated about why Frederic Thesiger chose to split his forces at Isandlwana. The simple truth is that he was outmaneuvered by a highly skilled opponent who had also divided his forces that day. Thesiger had dispatched patrols, which reported sighting a large mass of Zulus. In his judgment, he believed this group to be the main Zulu army, a reasonable assumption given the information available at the time. Unfortunately, other scouting parties failed to detect approximately 25,000 Zulu warriors concealed just a few miles from the main camp. This oversight was not entirely his fault; it merely highlights the challenges of command in such circumstances. Moreover, his assumption wasn’t far off the mark. The day prior, his patrols had observed Zulu movements. In the photo above, you can see the hills in the distance, located about twelve miles from Isandlwana — these are the very hills where the patrols spotted a significant Zulu force.
Dartnell, who commanded the patrol, sent a message to Chelmsford at 2 a.m., reporting that he had spotted the Zulus. This news aligned perfectly with Chelmsford’s assumptions — he believed he now knew the enemy’s location. Confident in his plan, Chelmsford decided to split his forces, taking the more mobile units to engage the Zulus on terrain of his choosing rather than theirs. By 4 a.m., his troops were on the move, ready to confront the Zulu forces — or so they thought.
Chelmsford left 1,700 men behind at the camp, along with an additional detachment of native troops under Durnford’s command, stationed at Rorke’s Drift with orders to reinforce the camp at Isandlwana. By Chelmsford’s reasoning, this should have been more than enough to defend the camp in case of an attack. His decision seemed rational at the time; he believed he had pinpointed the Zulus’ location and feared that delaying action might allow them to reposition, forcing him to search for them again.
Acting on this belief, he took his mobile forces to engage the enemy. However, this decision would prove disastrous. The men he left behind at the camp suffered a catastrophic defeat; all but 100 were killed. Upon returning to the encampment, Chelmsford was reportedly in shock, exclaiming, “But I left over 1,700 men — what has happened?” It was at this moment that he realized his days in South Africa were numbered. When news of the disaster reached London, recriminations followed swiftly, and Chelmsford was replaced. In the months ahead, more calamities would unfold.
From my perspective, the British officers were ill-prepared to handle the native Zulus. While warfare in Europe was evolving, the Zulus adhered to traditional methods of combat — methods that proved devastatingly effective. A precedent had been set three years earlier in the United States, where another native force inflicted a similar defeat on an American officer named Custer. Unlike Custer, who perished in battle, Chelmsford survived but faced the ignominy of covering up his failure. He shifted the blame onto Durnford and Pulleine, the two senior officers at Isandlwana, knowing full well that dead men cannot defend themselves. Though Chelmsford attempted to salvage his reputation, his return to England was met with rebuke. He was never again entrusted with command in the field and ultimately passed away playing billiards at his club in London.
Colonel Charles Pearson
Having repulsed the Zulu attack of 6,000 Zulus he and his men made their way a few more miles to a place called Eshowe which is the oldest European settlement in Zululand. By this time the battle at Isandlwana was now over, although he would not have even known there had been a battle let alone known the aftermath of it. His main objective was the Zululand capital of Ulundi. However, Charles Pearson now knows the whole of the countryside is swarming with Zulus and he knows he has had a very narrow escape if it not for the overwhelming firepower of his men events might have been different, but he is still 96K from Ulundi with no support, so to go on would have been seen as disastrous. Pearson does the only thing he can do in that position. He finds a higher position and digs in. He and his men actualy build a good defensive position, they clear the area, dig a ditch all around where they are and build a small fort. It's overgrown now but you can still see the remains of it. There is a cemetery where they buried the British soldiers who died there. It's always sad to see these kinds of graves many are overgrown, but the local people do their best to care for them, but apart from the battlefield tourists that are interested, no one else ever comes to them and some of them are not that easy to find.
Colonel Charles Pearson and his men were stuck here from 22 January until the first week of April. and Chelmsford had to fight a major battle at Gingindlovu to clear out the Zulu. This time Chelmsford decided the only way to fight the Zulu was to form a square an outdated manoeuver usually formed against Calvery charges
It worked by forming Square and with the firepower of the Gatling guns along with the artillery pieces and the sustained firepower of the men, Chelmsford broke the Zulu. He then unleashed the mounted men and they chased the Zulu for miles killing any they found. No prisoners were taken, and all the wounded were killed on the spot. There was to be no mercy whatsoever after what they had seen at Isandlwana and other smaller battles and Pearson himself sums up the mood in his journal of events.
We have so little grass to feed our cattle that we have to take them further afield under armed guard. I went with them one day and saw many Zulus. They kept their distance, but they shouted insults at us and ended with, you eat our Mealey today but tomorrow we drink your coffee. I wish to goodness they would try, they will get no quarter from us, and our battle cry will be remembered in the number three column. He was of course talking about his regiment at Isandlwana. and I long for nothing more than to lay this land to waste and sow this land with black bodies
This was from an officer who in the battle he had fought on Jan 22 had made sure the wounded Zulus had been patched up and sent on their way back to their families. So from this, you can see that hearts had hardened after Isandlwana, the Zulu showed no mercy, so be it there will be no mercy shown by the British.
Pearson went on to become a Lieutenant-general and was later knighted. He died on 2 October 1909.
What happened to Midshipman, Lewis Coker who was the first one in the British military to use a Gatling gun in battle?
Well, he was not so lucky, he was nineteen years of age and he was proud of the fact that he had used his Gatling gun to good effect. He was in charge of it and decided to sleep next to it every night while they were in the fort at Eshowe. The gun was positioned outside the fort and that's where he slept, not that it was much better inside the fort, but most of it was uncovered and disease and ailments soon took its toil. Midshipman, Lewis Cokersoon fell ill
He died from disease and is buried in the cemetery. Such a waste, he was a proudly dedicated sailor who knew what was expected of him, who knows how far he would have gone in the navy if he had lived? At nineteen years of age, he was already in charge of one of the Navy's newest weapons. The Gattling gun had a crew of four
A few photos from Eshowe and Gingindlovu cemetery's
Eshowe military graveyard. Most of the soldiers and sailors died from Enteric Diseases. Enteric diseases are caused by micro-organisms such as viruses, bacteria and parasites that cause intestinal illness. These diseases most frequently result from consuming contaminated food or water and some can spread from person to person. which is not surprising in the cases at the fort at Eshowe as the water would have been contaminated, and the hygiene of the men preparing the food would not have been good, I doubt they could wash their hands with the little water they would have had and in 1879 they would not have had the antibiotics we have today.
As you can see better from this phot the graves are all on a slope
Lieutenant B. Evelyn, was with the 2/3rd regiment, the Buffs, he was 21 years old when he also succumbed to Enteric.
These five graves, have their own little plot, they are from left to right, front row, Private R. Marshall, 3/69th Rifles, centre, is Private J. Smith, of the 99th Regiment, right is, Private J. Pratt, 3/60th Rifles, back left is, Private J. Dunn of the 3rd Regiment and back right is, Private J. Lawrence, of the 99th Regiment. The single grave behind, is the collective, grave of five Black Auxiliaries.
I hope you enjoyed my story. My next tale will delve into another pivotal battle of the Zulu War, fought on the heights of Hlobane. To give you a glimpse of the terrain where this dramatic clash unfolded, I’ve included the following photos. These images show the area where 20,000 Zulus ascended and managed to trap a significant contingent of the mounted British army.
And this photo is of the only escape route that they could take. I am sure you can see the problem for men on horseback.
